Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1995

Utah v. Medel : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Patrick L. Anderson; Attorney for Appellant.
Kenneth A Bronston; Assistant Attorney General; .
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Frank Medel, No. 950514 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6799

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
Case No. 950514-CA
FRANK MEDEL, JR.,
Priority No. 3
Appellant

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
This is an appeal from the denial of Mr. Medel's
motions to withdraw his guilty pleas to four first
degree felonies, which denial was entered by the
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley of the Third District Court
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

KENNETH BRONSTON
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
HEBER M. WELLS BUILDING
160 EAST 300 SOUTH, 6TH FL.
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114

PATRICK L. ANDERSON #4787
321 SOUTH 600 EAST
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84102
TELEPHONE: (801)322-5678
ATTORNEY FOR MR. MEDEL

ATTORNEY FOR STATE OF UTAH

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50
A

OCKET NO.

^rxm-cfi

JAN 2 0 1998
COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
:

Case No. 950514-CA

:

Priority No. 3

FRANK MEDEL, JR.,
Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
This is an appeal from the denial of Mr. Medel's
motions to withdraw his guilty pleas to four first
degree felonies, which denial was entered by the
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley of the Third District Court
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

KENNETH BRONSTON
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
HEBER M. WELLS BUILDING
160 EAST 300 SOUTH, 6TH FL
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114

PATRICK L. ANDERSON #4787
321 SOUTH 600 EAST
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84102
TELEPHONE: (801)322-5678
ATTORNEY FOR MR. MEDEL

ATTORNEY FOR STATE OF UTAH

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ARGUMENT

1

I. MR. MEDEL'S FAILURE TO UNDERSTAND
THE ILLUSORY PLEA BARGAIN
ENTITLES HIM TO WITHDRAW THE PLEAS

1

A. MR. MEDEL IS PREJUDICED BY THE INVOLUNTARILY
ENTERED PLEA

1

B. THE ERROR WAS NOT "INVITED" BY MR. MEDEL

3

C. MODIFICATION OF THE JUDGMENT IS NOT APPROPRIATE

6

D. THE STATE HAS NOT JUSTIFIED THE APPLICATION OF
THE LACHES DOCTRINE
E. BECAUSE THE TERMS OF THE PLEA BARGAIN CANNOT BE
FULFILLED, ALL PLEAS MUST BE WITHDRAWN

11
13

II. THE RECORD AS A WHOLE FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE
COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 11

15

CONCLUSION

15

i.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Angelos v. First Interstate Bank. 671 P.2d 772 (Utah 1983)

.

11

Boykin v. Alabama. 395 U.S. 238 (1969)

11

Martin v. State. 480 N.E.2d 548 (Ind. 1985)

9-10

McFarland v. Indiana. 384 N.E.2d 1104 (Ind. App. 1979)
Ritchie v. Indiana. 189 N.E.2d 575 (Ind. 1963)

.

....

9
9

State v. Babbell. 770 P.2d 987 (Utah 1989)

6

State v. Bindrup. 655 P.2d 674 (Utah 1982)

6

State v. Breckenridge. 688 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983)

3

State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992)

3

State v. Copeland. 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988)

....

State v. Dunn. 850 P. 2d 1201 (Utah 1993)

4

State v. Gibson. 634 P.2d 1294 (N.M. App. 1981)
State v. Gleason. 405 P.2d 793 (Utah 1965)

11, 13, 14

. '.

State v. Parsons. 781 P.2d 1275 (Utah 1987)
State v. Patience. 944 P.2d 381 (Utah App. 1997)
State v. Perdue. 813 P.2d 1201 (Utah App. 1991)

14
5
.4
5, 14
4

State v. Pharris. 798 P.2d 772 (Utah App.),
cert, denied. 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990)

2-3

State v. Thompson. 170 P.2d 153 (Utah 1946)

5

State v. Tillman. 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987)

4

State v. West. 765 P.2d 891 (Utah 1988)
ii.

13

STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Indiana Rule of Appellate Procedure 15
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402

9
7-8

iii.
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v.
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:
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FRANK MEDEL, JR.,
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ARGUMENT
I.
MR. MEDEL'S FAILURE TO UNDERSTAND
THE ILLUSORY PLEA BARGAIN
ENTITLES HIM TO WITHDRAW THE PLEAS.
A. MR. MEDEL IS PREJUDICED BY THE INVOLUNTARILY ENTERED PLEA.
The State concedes that the trial court lacked the authority
to sentence Mr. Medel in accordance with the plea agreement,
which contemplated that the minimum mandatory offense, aggravated
sexual assault, would be treated as a first degree non-minimum
mandatory offense for sentencing purposes.

State's brief at 10

and n.8.
However, the State contends that Medel has not met the
prejudice prong of the plain error or ineffective assistance of
counsel standards because both the trial court and the board of

pardons have treated Medel in accordance with the plea agreement,
as though he were convicted of a non-minimum mandatory first
degree felony.

State's brief at 8-11 and n.9.

The State cites

no authority in support of its assertion that the proper focus in
assessing prejudice is on whether or not the defendant's
incorrect expectations were met.
Contrary to the State's argument, in the context of
involuntarily entered pleas, the Courts do not engage in a
prejudice analysis focusing on whether the defendant's
expectations in the plea bargain were fulfilled.

The violation

of the defendant's substantial constitutional rights in the entry
of the plea constitutes prejudice in this context.
This is demonstrated by State v. Pharris, 798 P.2d 772 (Utah
App.), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990), wherein this
Court utilized the plain error doctrine to reverse the trial
court's denial of Pharris's motion to withdraw the guilty plea.
The Court stated,
The Utah Supreme Court has enunciated a two-part
test for determining plain error. First, the error
must be "plain," which means "from our examination of
the record, we must be able to say that it should have
been obvious to the trial court that it was committing
error." Second, the error "must affect the substantial
rights of the accused, i.e., that the error be
harmful." Id.
The defendant's guilty plea in this case was
2

entered after the Gibbons case was decided. Therefore,
it should have been obvious to the trial judge that
strict compliance with Rule 11 was required. In
addition, defendant's substantial constitutional rights
were affected by this failure to strictly comply with
Rule 11.
Id. at 774 n.5 (citations omitted).
Pharris is consistent with other Utah cases demonstrating
that adequate prejudice is established to meet the plain error
standard in the context of a motion to withdraw the plea, if the
record reflects that the plea was constitutionally involuntary.1
B. THE ERROR WAS NOT "INVITED" BY MR. MEDEL.
The State argues in a similar vein that Mr. Medel invited
the error involved in his plea to a minimum mandatory offense
under the understanding that it could be treated as a regular
first degree felony.

State's brief at 11-14.

Where the record shows that the trial court, defense
attorney, and prosecutor apparently misunderstood the law which

See e.g. State v. Breckenridgef 688 P.2d 440 (Utah
1983)(defendant pled guilty to arson and was sentenced to a term
of zero to five years; court reversed order denying motion to
withdraw guilty plea on basis raised for the first time on appeal
- that defendant did not voluntarily enter the plea because there
was no factual basis for plea, and record demonstrated
defendant's lack of understanding of the nature and elements of
the crime); State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851, 853-54 (Utah
1992)(characterizing Breckenridge as "a case of plain error in
which the Eldredge standard was clearly met.").
3

forbade them from treating a minimum mandatory offense as a nonminimum mandatory offense, particularly in the absence of one
scintilla of evidence that Mr. Medel had any legal acumen at the
time of his pleas, it is unreasonable to suggest that Mr. Medel
himself managed to plant the error in the trial court.

It is

apparent from the stipulation of the parties that the plea
bargain was not dictated by Medel, but was the fruit of
negotiations between the prosecuting attorney and defense
counsel.

For instance, the stipulation entered in the record

after the pleas were entered states, uIn case CR87-387, it was
Mr. Cope and defense counsel's intention from the inception of
the second offer that they would stipulate that Aggravated Sexual
Assault was a 1 [degree] felony, but not punishable as a minimum
mandatory offense." (R. 262-263).
The vast majority of cases relied on by the State in support
of its invited error argument does not involve an involuntarily
entered plea.2

The doctrine of invited error normally applies to

2

£££ State v. Perdue. 813 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah App.
1991)(defendant could not attack his own jury instructions on
appeal); State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993) (defendant
could not complain of trial court's pretrial ruling which may
have resulted from the defendant's memorandum incorrectly stating
the law); State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1285 (Utah
1987)(defendant precluded from raising jury voir dire issue which
was expressly waived in the trial court); State v. Tillman. 750
4

intentional tactical decisions made by attorneys, see id.. and to
the knowledge of defense counsel, has never been applied by any
Utah court to avoid a claim that a criminal defendant
misunderstood his plea agreement and the offense to which he
pled.

Compare e,g. State v, West/ 765 P.2d 891 (Utah 1988)(case

remanded to trial court for determination of whether plea was
involuntarily entered when it appeared that the parties and trial
court misunderstood the governing law at the time of the entry of
the plea); State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381 (Utah App. 1997) (in
remanding for resentencing to class A misdemeanor, despite the
parties' belief at the time of entry of plea that offense was a
third degree felony, the Court made no suggestion that the case
could be disposed of on the basis of the defendant's having
invited the error).3

P.2d 546, 561 (Utah 1987)(defendant could not attack prosecutor's
argument which was invited by the argument of defense counsel);
State v. Thompson, 170 P.2d 153, 161-62 (Utah 1946)(defendant
barred from assailing on appeal jury instructions similar to
those he himself submitted); State v. Gleason, 405 P.2d 793, 79495 (Utah 1965)(defendant's requested jury instruction
characterized as quasi-invited error, where request for
instruction could have been made earlier to avoid the error).
3

It is noteworthy that in State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381
(Utah App. 1997), where the State had mistakenly entered into a
plea bargain in which the defendant was entitled to a lesser
sentence than expected by the parties at the time of the plea, on
appeal, the State did not claim that it had invited the error.
5

C. MODIFICATION OF THE JUDGMENT IS NOT APPROPRIATE.
The State recognizes that under State v. Babbell. 770 P.2d
987, 993-94 (Utah 1989), this Court may recognize a need to
correct the illegal sentence currently being served by Medel.
State's brief at 15.

In apparent recognition that correction of

the sentence would further jeopardize the pleas, the State argues
that the appropriate remedy is to somehow alter the judgment from
a minimum mandatory offense to a different first degree felony,
to which Mr. Medel did not plead guilty.

State's brief at 14-18.

The Utah case the State cites in support of this novel
suggestion is State v. Bindrup, 655 P.2d 674 (Utah 1982), in
which the Utah Supreme Court found that the second degree murder
verdict found by the trial court following a bench trial was not
supported by sufficient evidence.

Id. at 676. Acting pursuant

to Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402(5), the appellate court found that a
conviction could enter for manslaughter, the next lower degree of
offense for which there was sufficient evidence.

Id.

Rather, the State claimed that the plea bargain should be
rescinded because it was founded on a mutual mistake, and claimed
that the defendant was attempting to take unfair advantage of the
misunderstanding in seeking the lesser sentence to which she was
lawfully entitled.
It would seem that the State's own theory in Patience
reinforces Medel's claim that he is entitled to withdraw his
guilty pleas. See id.
6

The statute permitting a modification of the judgment in
Bindrup provides, in relevant part,
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict
or judgment, or an appellate court on appeal or
certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient
evidence to support a conviction for the offense
charged but that there is sufficient evidence to
support a conviction for an included offense and the
trier of fact necessarily found every fact required for
conviction of that included offense, the verdict or
judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and
a judgment of conviction entered for the included
offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such
relief is sought by the defendant.4

4

The entire statute currently reads,
§ 76-1-402.
Separate offenses arising out of single
criminal episode -- Included offenses
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single
criminal action for all separate offenses arising out
of a single criminal episode; however, when the same
act of a defendant under a single criminal episode
shall establish offenses which may be punished in
different ways under different provisions of this code,
the act shall be punishable under only one such
provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence
under any such provision bars a prosecution under any
other such provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses
under a single criminal episode, unless the court
otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant shall
not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses
when:
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a
single court; and
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting
attorney at the time the defendant is arraigned on the
first information or indictment
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense
included in the offense charged but may not be

7

By its own terms, the statute has no application here, where
the conviction is not jeopardized by insufficient evidence, but
by an involuntarily entered plea.

Moreover, Mr. Medel is not

seeking a conviction on a lower category of offense, but seeks
the withdrawal of his guilty pleas.
The other case the State cites in support of its

convicted of both the offense charged and the included
offense. An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the
same or less than all the facts required to
establish the commission of the offense
charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt,
solicitation, conspiracy, or form of
preparation to commit the offense charged or
an offense otherwise included therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a
statute as a lesser included offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the
jury with respect to an included offense unless there
is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of
the included offense.
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or
judgment, or an appellate court on appeal or
certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient
evidence to support a conviction for the offense
charged but that there is sufficient evidence to
support a conviction for an included offense and the
trier of fact necessarily found every fact required for
conviction of that included offense, the verdict or
judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and
a judgment of conviction entered for the included
offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such
relief is sought by the defendant.

8

modification theory, Martin v. State. 480 N.E.2d 548 (Ind. 1985),
has questionable legal underpinnings 5 and is factually

5

The three authorities cited by the Martin court in support
of its modification of the conviction seem to provide little
support for the court's order. Subsection (N) of Indiana Rule of
Appellate Procedure 15, provides the court's general authority on
appeal, and currently states,
(N) Order or relief granted on appeal. An order
or judgment upon appeal may be reversed as to some or
all of the parties and in whole or in part. The court,
with respect to all or some of the parties or upon all
or some of the issues, may order:
(1) A new trial;
(2) Entry of final judgment;
(3) Correction of a judgment subject to
correction, alteration, amendment or modification;
(4) In the case of claims tried without a jury or
with an advisory order the findings or judgment amended
or corrected as provided in Rule 52(B);
(5) In the case of excessive or inadequate
damages, entry of final judgment on the evidence for
the amount of the proper damages, a new trial, or a new
trial subject to additur or remittitur; or
(6) Grant any appropriate relief, and make relief
subject to conditions.
Neither this rule, nor any Utah provision cited by the State,
purports to authorize a court to modify a judgment to reflect a
conviction for an offense other than the offense pled to. The
cases relied on by the Martin court are also of little value,
inasmuch as they both involve correction of erroneous judgments
following jury trials, and do not involve constitutionally
involuntary pleas. See Ritchie v. Indiana, 189 N.E.2d 575 (Ind.
1963)(verdict of rape was not sustained by the evidence; court
ordered modification of the judgment to reflect a conviction of a
lesser included offense for which the defendant conceded there
was sufficient evidence); McFarland v. Indiana, 384 N.E.2d 1104
(Ind. App. 1979)(following a trial wherein defendant was
convicted of two offenses, appellate court ordered modification
of judgment to remove one illegal conviction).
It appears that no court outside of the state of Indiana has

9

distinguishable from this case, in any event.
In Martin, the defendant was charged with attempted robbery,
and the record of plea proceedings confirmed that he was in fact
guilty of only attempted robbery.

!£. at 550-551 and n.2.

Despite the fact that the plea bargain clearly contemplated that
the defendant would plead guilty as charged to attempted robbery
in exchange for a recommendation that he would serve only a year,
the defendant ended up pleading guilty to armed robbery, a more
serious offense.

Id. at 551. After extended post-conviction

proceedings, the Indiana Supreme Court found that inasmuch as the
defendant had served the one year contemplated by the plea
agreement, the fact that he had pled to a charge of which he was
not guilty did not require withdrawal of the plea.

The court

found that the appropriate action was to modify the judgment to
reflect a conviction for attempted robbery, in accordance with
the plea agreement. Id.
Medel's case differs from Martin's in this important
respect: Medel's guilty plea was entered under a fundamental
misunderstanding of the governing law -- that a minimum mandatory
offense could be treated as a non-minimum mandatory offense by

ever cited to or relied on Martin.
10

virtue of the agreement of the parties.

Medel's failure to

understand what he was doing in entering the legally impossible
plea renders his plea constitutionally involuntary, and entitles
him to withdrawal of the pleas.

See e.g. State v. Copelandr 765

P.2d 1266, 1275-76 (Utah 1988).
Modification of the judgment would be highly inappropriate
in the case involving a guilty plea, where the validity of the
conviction hinges on the defendant's understanding of the offense
to which he pleads guilty, and not on whether a different offense
might be found to fulfill the "spirit" of the plea bargain.
Compare State's brief at 17 with e.g. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.
238, 243-44 (1969) (guilt plea unconstitutional in absence of
record proof that plea was knowing and voluntary).
D. THE STATE HAS NOT JUSTIFIED THE APPLICATION OF THE LACHES
DOCTRINE.
The State asserts the doctrine of laches, and argues that it
would be unconscionable, some ten years after the entry of the
pleas, to permit withdrawal of the guilty pleas where Mr. Medel
has received the benefit of his bargain.

State's brief at 17.

According to Angelos v. First Interstate Bankf 671 P.2d 772 (Utah
1983), "Laches is not mere delay, but delay that works a
disadvantage to another. To constitute

11

laches, two elements must

be established: (1) The lack of diligence on the part of
plaintiff; [and] (2) An injury to defendant owing to such lack of
diligence."

Id. at 777 (citation omitted).

There has been on showing that Medel has been lacking in his
diligence to obtain relief while acting as a pro se litigant
incarcerated at the Utah State Prison.

While significant time

has passed since the entry of the pleas, it must be remembered
that Mr. Medel began his efforts to obtain relief within one
month of the entry of the pleas, on July 2, 1987, when he moved
the trial court to provide a transcript of his cases, to
facilitate his "prosecution" of the case under Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 65b(i) (R. 52-56; 163-67; 268-272).

Following the

denial of this motion, Medel's pro se post-conviction petition
seeking withdrawal of the pleas was eventually filed in July of
1994 (R. 79), and the case has been in litigation since that
time.

See Statement of the Case, in Mr. Medel's opening brief at

5-6.
The State has articulated no prejudice that would befall it
in the event of the withdrawal of Mr. Medel's pleas.
Most importantly, contrary to the State's assertion, Medel
has not received the benefit of his bargain because he currently
stands convicted of a minimum mandatory offense; and because the
12

bargain was fundamentally flawed from the outset by the parties'
misunderstanding of the governing law, and by the trial court's
failures to inform Mr. Medel of the rights he was sacrificing in
entering into the plea agreement.
Because Mr. Medel was induced to enter his pleas on the
mistaken belief that the prosecutor and defense attorney had the
power to exempt his aggravated sexual assault conviction from the
mandatory sentence required by the legislature, the pleas were
involuntary, and subject to withdrawal on Mr. Medel's motion.
Sfifi Copeland, supra.

£e£ also State v. West; 765 P.2d 891, 896

(Utah 1988) (NXX [I]n order to plead voluntarily, a defendant must
know the direct consequences of his plea, including the actual
value of any commitments made to him.

Where, as here, counsel's

alleged advice, corroborated by the information supplied by the
court, grossly exaggerated the benefit to be derived from the
pleas of guilty, it would follow that the pleas were not
voluntary.'")(citations omitted).
E. BECAUSE THE TERMS OF THE PLEA BARGAIN CANNOT BE FULFILLED, ALL
PLEAS MUST BE WITHDRAWN.
In footnote 7 of its brief, the State suggests that if the
entry of the plea to aggravated sexual assault in case number 387
is considered involuntary, the guilty pleas to the pleas in cases

13

280 and 386 should nonetheless stand.

State's brief page 9 n.7.

Throughout the proceedings in the lower courts, the parties
and courts have recognized that all of the pleas were entered in
the three separate cases as part of one overriding plea bargain
(e.g. R. 262-264) . The record in the instant case clearly
demonstrates that Mr. Medel had no intention of entering into a
plea agreement unless he would avoid all minimum mandatory
offenses, and that his entry into the plea agreement encompassing
all three cases was contingent on the absence of a minimum
mandatory conviction (e.g. R. 262-264).

The lower courts and

parties have similarly treated Mr. Medel's claims regarding
various inadequacies in the entry of his pleas as supporting his
overall motion to withdraw all guilty pleas, which were
encompassed in the one plea bargain (e.g. R. 315-336).
The fact that the pleas entered failed to comport with
Medel's condition and understanding of the plea agreement renders
them all constitutionally involuntary and subject to withdrawal.

£££ e,g, Copeiand, supra.

&ae also e,g. State v. Gibson, 634

P.2d 1294, 1295 (N.M. App. 1981)("If a plea agreement is not
followed in all its parts, the entire agreement is
rejected.")(citing Eller v. State. 582 P.2d 824 (N.M. 1978)),
cited in State v. Patience. 944 P.2d 381 (Utah App. 1997) .
14

II.
THE RECORD AS A WHOLE
FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 11.
Mr. Medel maintains the factual and legal arguments set
forth in his opening brief, and without further argument, asks
this Court to determine that the lower court abused its
discretion in finding that the record as a whole demonstrates
compliance with Rule 11.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the trial court's order denying
Mr. Medel's motion to withdraw the guilty pleas.
Dated this

. d a y of \J&r\u<&A--f

Patrick L. Anderson
Counsel for Mr. Medel
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